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Abstract 
Recent experience has shown that the concept of 
robot ethics is important for establishing norms 
defining allowed behaviors for unmanned systems. 
However, approaches considered to date are either 
based on highly abstract artificial intelligence 
schemes or else uniquely “hard wired” into a given 
robotic architecture in an unrepeatable fashion. A 
more-general approach is needed for defining and 
deploying ethical constraints on robotic systems that 
are expected to operate autonomously with only 
occasional human control. 
This paper explores development of a practical 
approach to ethical operation of unmanned maritime 
systems in maritime environments. This approach is 
based on the Rational Behavior Model (RBM), a 
three-layer robot control architecture modeled on the 
control hierarchy of Naval vessels. RBM utilizes a 
finite state machine as the basis for mission definition 
and high-level control. This approach provides for 
exhaustive pre-mission testing by human operators 
and predictable runtime decision-making that takes 
mission-specific ethical constraints into account.  
The authors believe that these achievable approaches 
for ethically constrained mission planning and 
operations can be applied to a broad range of 
unmanned systems. The potential legal and ethical 
impacts of unmanned systems in the real world must 
be considered and addressed. Although our focus is 
on the most challenging circumstances of 
autonomous lethality in naval scenarios, the same 
approaches also appear to be relevant to scientific, 
commercial and civilian operations by unmanned 
maritime systems.  This work opens a practical door 
leading into that necessary future. 
Approach Overview 
Ethical operation of unmanned systems is becoming a 
topic of significant importance not only for operators, 
but for decision-makers, developers, and policy-
makers as well. At the same time, increasing onboard 
computational capabilities have enabled these 
systems to operate with more autonomy and to 
conduct increasingly complex missions with little or 
no human intervention. A number of approaches to 
the implementation of ethics for unmanned systems 
have been suggested [1]. Many of these are premised 
on the availability of robust artificial intelligence (AI) 
algorithms. 
Legal culpability requires predictable, consistent, and 
repeatable robot activities that are conducted 
coherently with human operators. Decades of 
implementation experience have led us to believe that 
human-like intelligence and judgment are not 
required to achieve a useful operational capability in 
autonomous mobile robots. Furthermore, we are 
convinced that fundamental and useful types of robot 
ethical behavior can also be attained, even in 
hazardous or military environments, without 
invoking concepts of AI whose consistent 
implementation may prove speculative, futuristic, and 
operationally ambiguous. 
Current research work at NPS has demonstrated 
practical approaches for ethical reasoning to govern 
robot behaviors. These consist of applying ethical 
constraints to existing patterns of robot planning in a 
manner that matches real-world operational 
constraints, rather than creating some new paradigm 
for philosophical contemplation. This approach is 
intentionally grounded in patterns of command 
decision-making used by military forces, which often 
must operate in a loosely coordinated fashion while 
observing highly consistent rules of engagement 
(ROE). Our focus is on maritime robotics supporting 
fleet and coalition naval forces. The same ethical 
patterns also appear to be applicable to scientific and 
commercial use of unmanned maritime systems. 
Three key insights inform this work. First is that 
humans working in military units are able to deal 
with these challenges without ethical quandaries; 
unmanned systems need to compatibly follow  their 
operations orders and ROEs under loose supervision, 
just as any other military unit might. Second is that 
abstract ethical behaviors don’t define the mission 
plan; rather ethical constraints inform the mission 
plan. Ethical tasking is a modification of regular 
tasking, not an entirely new philosophical paradigm. 
Third is that the most-promising path forward lies in 
producing general mission orders that are first 
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understandable by (legally culpable) humans, then 
reliably and safely executable by robots. 
Recent project results include defining, evaluating 
and visualizing tactical missions for unmanned 
systems using open-source NPS simulation software, 
the Autonomous and Unmanned Vehicle Workbench 
(AUVW). It is also feasible to meaningfully rehearse 
robot operations using simulation prior to field 
testing. An important aspect of our work is that 
mission orders can be tested exhaustively in human 
executable form before being translated into robot 
executable form. This provides the kind of 
transparency and accountability needed for after-
action review of missions, and possible legal 
proceedings in case of loss of life or property 
resulting from errors in performing mission orders. 
This paper describes a practical approach to the 
implementation of ethical behavior for unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUVs) and other maritime 
vehicles which operate autonomously while 
following human-specified mission guidance.  
Specific topics include a discussion of operational 
ethics as they relate to unmanned vehicles, the 
Rational Behavior Model (RBM) unmanned system 
control architecture, and extensions to RBM that 
incorporate ethical constraints. Examples are 
presented along with a comparison to other proposed 
approaches to ethical unmanned system operation. 
Ethics and Unmanned Systems in Maritime and 
Underwater Environments 
The ethical and legal concerns attendant upon the 
development of unmanned underwater and surface 
vehicles (UUVs, USVs) are, at first glance, 
continuous with those already encountered in the 
aerial environment (which, owing to the use of 
Predators and Reapers in “targeted killing” 
operations, has garnered the most attention). In all 
environments, the concerns focus on the prospects for 
operational compliance with relevant international 
law (especially the Law of Armed Conflict, LOAC), 
and the dilemmas of moral and legal accountability 
for the consequences of noncompliance (for whatever 
reason) with these prevailing norms. 
In the so-called “just war tradition,” as well as in 
international law, the most important and relevant 
norms or principles guiding the conduct of armed 
conflict are usually termed “discrimination” (or 
distinction) and “proportionality.”  The former 
specifies that non-combatants (“civilians, and civilian 
objects”) are never legitimate targets of attack. This 
is also known as the “Principle of Noncombatant 
Immunity.”   
Proportionality, by contrast, imposes an economy of 
scale on the use of military force in tactical 
operations that are otherwise deemed to be required 
by the overall military and political strategy being 
pursued through armed conflict. Any tactical military 
operation that is deemed to be required to attain a 
legitimate military objective, and which is legally and 
morally permissible (inasmuch as it does not aim at 
achieving the military objective through the 
deliberate targeting of the lives and property of 
noncombatants), is further constrained under 
international law to employ only as much lethal force 
as is required to obtain the legitimate and permissible 
objective. This second principle is sometimes termed 
colloquially “the economy of force,” and demands 
that military personnel use only as much lethal force 
as is necessary to mission success, and not engage in 
reckless or wanton, unnecessary destruction or loss of 
life. In making that determination, moreover, the 
damage and loss of life caused by the operation 
(including inadvertent and unintended harm that 
might befall noncombatants) must be deemed 
reasonable in light of the importance of the objective 
attained. These vaguely-defined and imprecisely 
quantifiable concerns, taken together, comprise the 
Principle of Proportionality in combat. 
The increased military use of robotics in armed 
conflict has been driven as much by these legal and 
moral considerations as by economics. Like 
precision-guided munitions that preceded them, most 
military uses of robotics are thought to be, or (as 
some advocates claim) have proven to be 
simultaneously more discriminate in avoiding direct 
targeting of noncombatants, and vastly more 
proportional in the destruction and harm inflicted on 
adversaries generally, than their conventional 
counterparts. In principle (and setting aside the 
general problems associated with precise identity 
recognition and targeting in unmanned systems), any 
UAV or UUV can be programmed straightforwardly 
to never target civilians (“noncombatants”) or 
civilian objects. The precision with which they can 
otherwise direct uses of lethal force largely 
guarantees that their use in a given military operation 
will result in greater compliance with the demands of 
the Principle of Proportionality than will any 
conventional alternative. Those who defend, or 
advocate for the increased use of unmanned systems 
in armed conflict [1,2,3] do so largely in light of 
these considerations:  namely, that responsible use 
promises even greater compliance with the ethical 
and legal norms that govern armed conflict and the 
use of force generally. 
Critics of military robotics have, of course, 
challenged these findings and objected to these 
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promises as rosy and misleading [4-6]. They note, 
with some justification, that in concrete examples 
(such as the highly controversial use of unmanned or 
unoccupied aerial platforms in “targeted killings” of 
suspected terrorists), the technology makes feasible 
missions that would not likely otherwise be 
undertaken, and thus invariably inflicts casualties on 
noncombatants and their property that would 
otherwise not have occurred [2]. Were such systems 
enabled with increased autonomy, moreover, these 
critics [7] object that no meaningful accountability 
would attach under law or morality for such harm, 
whether inadvertent or somehow “deliberate” (in the 
sense of machine malfunction, or of mistaken 
character recognition in the targeting determination). 
In the case of full autonomy linked with lethal force, 
and absent any human oversight, neither the field 
commander, initial operator, nor manufacturer can be 
held criminally liable or otherwise morally 
accountable for the harm done, or the laws thereby 
violated, because the “machine itself” would have 
made and undertaken the relevant decisions and 
actions in question. Thus it seems (the critics 
conclude) absurd to hold a machine morally or 
legally accountable for its actions, which in turn leads 
to recommendations that robots with potentially 
lethal effects simply cannot be permitted. 
One dramatic response [1] is to design an 
autonomous and lethally armed unmanned system 
that is simultaneously morally responsible, and so 
capable of making moral decisions, complying with 
international law, and being held meaningfully 
responsible for errors or infractions. This admittedly 
complicated, formidable, and as-yet unrealized 
engineering goal would employ strong conceptions of 
artificial intelligence, to include as-yet undeveloped 
computational models of moral reasoning, while 
equipping unmanned systems themselves with a 
robotic analogue of moral emotions like “guilt,” 
which would aid the system in moderating and 
effectively controlling its use of force and its 
targeting decisions. An initiative to advance our 
current abilities in the area of artificial moral 
reasoning along such lines is currently being 
undertaken by interdisciplinary teams at Georgia 
Tech, and at Tufts and Brown Universities, for 
example. 
Our approach to “runtime ethics” offers several 
practical advantages over these alternatives, as well 
as with respect to these substantive obstacles and 
criticisms. First, the underwater environment is 
relatively free of potential moral hazards when 
compared with land or air environments.  Seabed 
infrastructure is usually well plotted and reported on 
nautical charts.  Trawlers and dive operations are 
easily locatable. Apart from the occasional whale, 
marine sanctuary, drift net, or perhaps James 
Cameron diving in the Mariana Trench, the 
underwater environment is largely devoid of mobile 
civilian or commercial operations that might pose 
risk of inadvertent harm. Hence the scale of 
difficulties presented by the twin principles of 
noncombatant immunity and proportionality are 
greatly reduced in comparison with these other, more 
familiar operational environments for unmanned 
systems. 
Secondly, our command-scenario approach to 
unmanned underwater systems does not entail, 
require, or aim at fully autonomous operation. 
Instead, the runtime environment is more correctly 
classified as “semi-autonomous” (in compliance with 
current OSD Guidance, 2012). UUVs within this 
environment are designed to operate autonomously 
under normal mission conditions, but also equipped 
to recognize when a maneuver or operation might 
encounter moral or legal restrictions (such as whether 
or not to follow an enemy submarine that undertakes 
evasive action by illegally entering a prohibited 
underwater marine preserve). In such instances, the 
system is programmed either to abort the mission and 
return to base, or else to “flag” the consequent 
decision for executive command oversight (very 
much as would a human submarine commander, 
engaged in such a mission and confronting such a 
moral or legal dilemma). This ensures either that 
mistakes and inadvertent violations of law are 
avoided, or that, when undertaken, ambiguous 
missions have been thoroughly vetted and approved 
by those capable of assuming command 
responsibility for the decisions. In this manner, we 
believe we have integrated ethical and legal concerns 
and constraints into the overall design and operation 
of our UUVs in a manner that is fully compliant, 
thoroughly responsive and responsible, and perhaps 
most importantly, feasible using existing technology, 
rather than relying on futuristic speculative 
technological advances. 
The Rational Behavior Model (RBM) 
Overview and History.  The initial form of the tri-
level RBM control architecture depicted graphically 
in Figure 1 was introduced in 1993 and extended over 
subsequent years to effectively link both high-level 
symbolic processing associated with mission 
planning and control to largely numerical 
computation required for real-time vehicle control 
and sensor processing [8, 9, 10]. In the vocabulary of 
the RBM formalism, the Execution Level is the 
lowest layer of vehicle control software and is 
concerned with carrying out the hard real-time tasks 
4 
 
typically associated with physical interaction of a 
vehicle with its surrounding medium. Operations at 
this level must execute in real time and are typically 
reactive in nature. In a manned submarine, these 
tasks are usually carried out by enlisted 
crewmembers and include responsibilities such as 
controlling diving planes, rudders, engine rpm, etc.  
In the middle RBM layer, the Tactical Level, 
Execution Level functions are organized into 
behaviors. Such functions include maintaining course 
and depth, sonar obstacle avoidance, maneuvering 
while surfaced, etc. However, the Tactical Level also 
includes more complicated behaviors such as sonar 
mapping, waypoint navigation, mapping, search 
planning, response to emergency situations, etc. The 
requirements of this layer correlate to the officer 
watchstanders in a manned submarine. In this 
context, the Tactical Level itself can be viewed as 
analogous to the Officer of the Deck responsible for 
coordinating the actions of the other watch officers to 
carry out high-level mission tasks [8, 10]. 
In addition to implementing behaviors, the Tactical 
Level is responsible for maintaining much of the 
vehicle’s state information in the form of a world 
model. In the context of ethical robot operation, this 
is an important responsibility because much of the 
robot’s situational awareness upon which ethical 
decisions rely is maintained in this model. Thus, it 
will be at the Tactical Level that adherence to or 
violation of ethical constraints will first be noted. We 
have repeatedly found that modeling robot logic after 
common human patterns for complex action provides 
an excellent structural basis for achieving robot 
responses that are both logically consistent and 
operationally complementary to human activities. 
The highest level of software in the RBM 
architecture is called the Strategic Level [8-10]. This 
level corresponds to the commanding officer of a 
manned submarine. Unlike the RBM Execution and 
Tactical Levels, the Strategic Level conducts only 
symbolic computation in a non-numeric mode. This 
level is responsible for considering alternative actions 
and making decisions without a sense of continuous 
time or space.  Stated differently, the Strategic Level 
operates entirely in the domain of mathematical logic 
to determine which high-level mission goals to 
pursue based solely on the success or failure of 
previous high-level goals. Thus, Strategic Level 
reasoning is conducted without regard for vehicle 
state and is based solely on the Tactical Level’s 
understanding of when the currently executing goal is 
successfully achieved, has failed to be achieved, or 
can no longer be pursued without violating ethical 
constraints [15]. 
The non-numerical nature of the Strategic Level 
allows for declarative mission definitions that are 
compatible with first-order logic.  Early Strategic 
Level implementations utilized the logical 
programming language Prolog to define missions that 
were both human readable and machine executable.  
Recent implementations, including the AUVW 
mission simulation and rehearsal system, have relied 
on XML vocabularies that also support both human 
readability and machine processing [11-13, 15-19]. In 
addition, the ubiquity and standardization of XML-
processing applications and programming interfaces 
makes XML vocabularies suitable for use on multiple 
vehicles and various computing platforms. 
Complex missions to be carried out by human agents 
are often specified in terms of a series of phases with 
predetermined phase transition rules and defined 
mission end conditions. The RBM models this 
approach by representing missions as finite state 
machines (FSM) where individual Strategic Level 
goals correspond to states and transitions are 
executed upon the success of failure of the 
corresponding goal. Specifying missions in this way 
provides a level of determinism at the Strategic 
Level.  That is, a specific sequence of Strategic Level 
goal successes and failures will result in a predictable 
goal execution sequence.  Subsequent sections will 
demonstrate the use of this determinism to support 
exhaustive mission testing that directly supports the 




Design: Mission Execution Automata (MEA). One 
aspect of the original RBM that slowed progress was 
need for a mathematical model for Strategic Level 
vehicle control. Recent work addressed this issue 
through formal definition of RBM semantics in 
mathematical terms as a generalization of a Turing 
Machine (TM) into a broader class of automata, 
Mission Execution Automata (MEA) [12-13,15-18].  
Figure 1.  RBM three-level architecture compared to 
the control paradigm of a manned naval vessel. [8] 
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Thus general approaches for a wide repertoire of activities 
can remain computationally tractable and consistently 
implementable across a complete variety of computer 
architectures.  Such generality is critical if common tasking 
paradigms are to be achieved for all unmanned systems. 
Deeper theoretical investigation was also pursued to 
confirm tractability.  A TM consists of an FSM augmented 
by an external agent in the form of a potentially infinite 
memory realized as the tape of an “incremental tape 
recorder”. It is known that no digital machine can be more 
computationally powerful than a universal Turing machine, 
in which the logical behavior of a specific FSM is encoded 
on the tape of the machine in the form of a state table [14]. 
The crux of TM generalization to MEAs is allowing the 
external agent to be not only a tape recorder, but 
alternatively, either a human being or a sensor-based robot 
[11]. Specifically, an MEA consists of a mission-specific 
FSM provided with one or more external agents. Each of 
these agents must have the ability to sense the environment 
in some well-defined and limited way and to respond to 
commands issued by the FSM and answer queries from the 
FSM using a predetermined, finite vocabulary [13]. 
Although, TMs have been almost exclusively relegated to 
the status of a mathematical concept, their generalization to 
an MEA provides an attractive UUV control mechanism 
that allows TM semantics to transparently interact with an 
RBM Tactical Level implementation to provide a 
convenient, mathematically grounded basis for control of 
long-duration autonomous robot missions that allows for 
dealing with unforeseen runtime contingencies [13]. 
An individual MEA is (by definition) mission specific since 
it utilizes a mission-specific FSM. For general application it 
has proven useful to define a universal Mission Execution 
Engine (MEE) that is analogous to a universal TM [14] that 
can implement a FSM representing an arbitrary UUV 
mission [15,16].  In this context the MEE can be viewed as 
executing mission orders for specific UUV missions just as 
the command structure of a manned submarine executes 
specific tasking from higher authority. These mission orders 
are also analogous to, but more general than, the machine 
description part of the universal TM [14]. For UUVs 
operating in high-risk environments, it is the authors’ 
contention that it is a moral imperative that human 
operators be legally accountable. The mathematical 
formalism provided by MEEs directly supports this level of 
accountability because its determinism allows mission 
orders to be subjected to exhaustive testing before actual 
robot execution.  When such testing has been completed, 
the senior mission specialist can formally approve orders as 
an executable specification for the subsequent generation of 
robot mission orders by robot specialists. The mission 
specialist then can reasonably assume legal accountability 
for any errors in mission orders. Further, mission orders 
specified in an executable form such as appropriately 
structured Prolog or XML can be read declaratively by non-
programmers (e.g., mission specialists) to provide the kind 
of transparency needed for after action review and possible 
legal proceedings relating to loss of life or property. 
Example RBM Mission using Prolog.  A simple five-phase 
unmanned vehicle reconnaissance mission might be phrased 
in specialized natural language as in Figure 2. This mission 
is used to illustrate the design of an MEA capable of 
carrying out any similar mission when expressed as a series 
of phases written as mission orders. It is assumed that the 
syntax and semantics of these specialized natural language 
mission orders are understood in the same way by both the 
person issuing the orders and the person receiving them. 
Orders written to achieve this objective are said to be 
syntactically well formed and semantically unambiguous. 
Figure 3 presents a more abstract representation of the logic 
of the example mission in the form of a state graph that 
includes “Start”, “Mission Abort” and “Mission Complete” 
terminal phases that are implicit in the natural language 
specification.  Although not directly executable, this 
depiction provides an intuitive view of the mission-specific 
state machine.  Evidently, this state graph is in agreement 
with the natural language mission orders of Figure 2. 
Executable specifications of this mission have been 
developed for simulation and human testing in both Prolog 
and XML [13, 15].  Human testing of the mission flow was 
demonstrated in [13] as shown in Figure 3, exploring the 
mission of interest shown in Figure 4.  The annotated user 
log depicts the results of three separate human mission tests 
of hypothetical mission progressions.  These tests show 
Strategic Level invocations of various phases and queries 
concerning the status of the currently executing phase.
Goal 1.  Proceed to Area A and search the area.  If the search is successful execute goal 2.  If the 
search is unsuccessful, execute goal 3. 
Goal 2.  Obtain an environment sample from Area A.  If the sample is obtained, execute goal 3.  If 
the sample cannot be obtained, proceed to recovery position to complete the mission. 
Goal 3.  Proceed to Area B and search the area.  Upon search success or failure, execute goal 4. 
Goal 4.  Proceed to Area C and rendezvous with UUV-2.  Upon rendezvous success or failure, proceed to 
recovery position to complete the mission. 
Figure 2.  Example mission orders expressed in structured natural language using a standardized vocabulary. [13,15-18] 
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Figure 4.  State Graph for example UUV area Search and 
Sample Mission, used in previous and current testing. [15] 
 Figure 3. Excerpted, annotated test results:  exhaustive 
interactive human testing of area search and sample mission 
orders.  User responses are shown in bold face. [15] 
For example, the first sequence tests the mission flow when 
the Tactical Level successfully completes all phases.   In 
this case the order of execution is search area A, sample 
environment, search area B, rendezvous with UUV-2, 
return to base, and mission complete. The second and third 
scenarios test different sequences of phase success and 
failure.  Because these tests are deterministic, the operator 
can definitively test mission flow for all possible sequences 
of phase success and failure.  As long as the FSM is free of 
loops and of reasonable complexity, exhaustive testing is 
possible. Additionally, the FSM’s mathematical rigor 
allows for automated structural testing of the mission for 
loops, state reachability, satisfiability, and acceptance of all 
possible phase success/failure sequences [14]. Mapping 
RBM to these fundamental constructs added confidence in 
the generality of this approach.  Nevertheless, TMs and 
FSMs are not defined at an appropriate level of abstraction 
to handle real-time mission control in a practical fashion. 
Human testability and automatic testability of mission logic 
are critical features that must be retained by any 
architectural design which hopes to inspire confidence in 
human supervisors that robot tasking is predictable, 
complete, and compliant with guiding regulatory doctrine. 
In addition to mission-flow testing with a human operator 
providing Tactical Level responses, this mission has also 
been tested in simulation using the AUVW as documented 
in [11]. Because simulation testing within the AUVW 
incorporates fully implemented Tactical and Execution 
Level software operating in a physically-based virtual 
environment, these tests provide important insights into 
how the mission is likely to progress in real-world 
situations.  
Autonomous Vehicle Command Language (AVCL) 
Tactical orders.  Over the past two decades, much work in 
this project has been dedicated to establishing a common 
declarative language that expresses task elements finding 
common employment in ships, submarines and aircraft.  
Typically such tasks and general orders are defined in a 
consistent manner for naval and commercial domains, as 
evidenced by the fact that human pilots and ship drivers can 
observe operations in the cockpit or control room of nearly 
any other vessel and immediately comprehend current 
activities.  Example general orders include “all ahead full,” 
“come right to course 090,” “make your depth/altitude 100 
meters,” “all stop” etc.  Low-level orders typically match 
open-loop control algorithms (e.g. “right full rudder”) or 
closed-loop control algorithms (e.g. “steady course north”). 
In the RBM architecture, this level of command is handled 
at the Tactical level.  The AVCL tactical command 
repertoire for USVs and UUVs are shown in Figures 5 and 
6 respectively.  Similar command sets have been derived 
for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground 
vehicles (UGVs).   
CG-USER(1): (?- execute_mission)) ; example 1 
Search Area A! 
Search successful? yes 
Sample environment! 
Sample obtained? yes 
Search Area B! 
Search successful? yes 
Rendezvous UUV2! 
Rendezvous successful? yes 
Return to base! 




CG-USER(2): (?- execute_mission)) ; example 2 
Search Area A! 
Search successful? yes 
Sample environment! 
Sample obtained? no 
Return to base! 




CG-USER(3): (?- execute_mission)) ; example 3 
Search Area A! 
Search successful? no  
Search Area B! 
Search successful? no 
Rendezvous UUV2! 
Rendezvous successful? yes 
Return to base! 





Figure 5.  Task vocabulary of Autonomous Vehicle 
Command Language (AVCL) commands for USVs, 
corresponding to RBM Tactical and Execution levels. 
Numerous missions have been simulated using these 
command sets.  AVCL missions can also be easily 
translated into a variety of command dialects or source-
code sequencers that are unique to a variety of types of 
robot architectures. Thus the current approach serves as an 
excellent basis for exploring mission-tasking issues for a 
wide range of robots.  
Some of the more-advanced tactical orders (“Hover at point 
X-ray,” “Rendezvous in Zone Charlie,” “Surface and return 
to base”) can match combinations of lower-level tactical 
orders.  An important characteristic of such tasks is that 
they either succeed or fail.  For tactical mission orders, 
more complicated mission orders are avoided.  This 
matches real-world conditions for human operators where 
various tasks and activities are either pursued or not.  Thus 
a set of tactical-level mission commands can be used as a 
single operational task block, running to completion in a 
linear fashion with no embedded decision-tree branching. 
Many of the simpler AVCL tactical commands directly 
invoke Execution Level functionality for open-loop or 
closed-loop control of basic vehicle maneuvering. All 
tactical orders, which operate sequentially and require 
varying time intervals, depend upon hard-real-time 
operation of a sense-decide-act RBM Execution Level to 
handle fundamental control issues. 
 
Figure 6.  The vocabulary of AVCL task commands for 
UUVs is closely similar, adding depth information (or 
altitude over bottom) to the repertoire shown for AVCL 
USV commands [19]. 
Strategic orders.  Mission logic, meaning decision-making 
choices and determination of courses of action, occurs at 
the Strategic level of the RBM architecture.  A different set 
of logical constructs is used for mission control at this level 
of abstraction.  Tactical-level tasks are considered, 
commanded and executed, as deemed appropriate, 
continuing through a series of task successes or failures, 
until a strategic-level mission is complete.  This separation 
of concerns between strategic-level decision making and 
tactical-level task execution provides a general approach to 
mission conduct that can unambiguously map to a wide 





Figure 7.  The strategic-level mission controller sequences 
through MEAs task phases until mission is complete.  Note 
that success/failure is an essential design characteristic for 
each phase of mission conduct. 
The following AVCL vocabulary of strategic-level mission 
MEAs is designed and implemented (to varying degrees) in 













Several example mission controllers follow in Figures 8 and 
9 that illustrate the basic algorithmic logic for specific 
operational vehicle tasks (e.g. searching an area, etc.) used 
by the Strategic Level.  Similar algorithms are provided for 
each of the strategic-level behaviors in the AVCL 
vocabulary.  Each tactical task can require an arbitrary or 
maximum time period to complete.  Each task type in the 
strategic-level mission vocabulary also runs to completion, 
reporting either failure or success when done.  An excerpted 
screenshot of the AUV Workbench graphical user interface 
(GUI) that supports goal editing follows in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 8.  Strategic goal task algorithm for Search [17].  
Completion status can only result in success or failure. 
 
Figure 9.  Strategic goal task algorithm for Decontaminate 
[17]. Completion status can only result in success or failure. 
 
Figure 10.  Example AUV Workbench GUI tabbed panel 
for editing an AVCL Search goal. [19] 
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Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
Devising a readable format for robot-mission definition is 
important in order to achieve portability among multiple 
computer systems.  AVCL is itself captured in XML, which 
not only provides plain-text readability but also full 
message validatability of both syntax and semantics.  This 
feature is essential for mission reliability, helping to ensure 
the highest possible quality assurance.  
Minor syntax or major semantic errors cannot be permitted 
to pass unchecked before deployment for at-sea execution. 
XML data inputs are portable and can be read and 
processed using libraries available for nearly any program 
language. Figure 11 shows example pseudo-code XML for 
the canonical mission.  Of note is that such syntax is 
readable both by humans and systems.  Further refinement 
produces AVCL-compliant mission specifications exactly 
matching the mission definitions found in Figures 2 and 4. 
 
Figure 11.  At top is pseudo-code XML describing the canonical mission of Figure 2 and 4, showing that machine-readable and human-
readable mission specifications are feasible. Below left is an excerpt from the fully validatable AVCL mission MEAMission.xml  [16,19] 
showing precise AVCL syntax which is machine (or human)-readable.  Lower right is matching XML tree view of same AVCL document. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<UUVMission> 
    <GoalSet> 
        <Goal area=”A” id=”goal1”> 
            <Search nextOnSucceed=”goal2” nextOnFail=”goal3”/> 
        </Goal> 
        <Goal area=”A” id=”goal2”> 
            <SampleEnvironment nextOnSucceed=”goal3” nextOnFail=”recover”/> 
        </Goal> 
        <Goal area=”B” id=”goal3”> 
            <Search nextOnSucceed=”goal4” nextOnFail=”goal4”/> 
        </Goal> 
        <Goal area=”C” id=”goal4”> 
            <Rendezvous nextOnSucceed=”recover” nextOnFail=”recover”/> 
        </Goal> 
        <Goal area=”recoveryPosition” id=”recover”> 
            <Transit nextOnSucceed=”missionComplete” nextOnFail=”missionAbort”/> 
        </Goal> 





Figure 12.  Canonical MEA mission on the left is sequenced by the Strategic Level controller, while the exemplar 
Tactical Level implementation on the right executes a corresponding series of ordered AVCL commands [12-13,15-19]. 
 
Figure 12 shows the original example MEA mission with 
emphasis added on logical outcome, along with the 
corresponding example RBM architectural implementation 
in the AUV Workbench. The left-hand side of Figure 12 
shows mission logic, with conditional branching based on 
the success or failure of each individual tactical goal task. 
The AUV Workbench can successfully simulate the 
conduct of these examples. 
The commonly shared interface design pattern for each goal 
type is illustrated in Figure 13.  The essential design 
characteristic that each task type concludes in either success 
or failure is important, because: 
• Goal modules are composable in any combination. 
• Missions of arbitrary logical complexity can be 
designed simply by connecting task modules. 
• Strategic mission-controller outputs consist of simple 
tactical-level commands that are each individually 
executable, either by unmanned or manned vehicles. 
• A repertoire of missions can be collected that is 
experimentally testable, in simulation or in situ. 
• Exported missions remain feasible for any variety of 
robot syntax or source code that can comply with 
common mission semantics used by humans. 
  
Figure 13.  Internal logic and common input/output 
goal interfaces, enabling general task composability. 
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Mission Simulation using AUV Workbench 
The NPS Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle (AUV) 
Workbench supports physics-based mission rehearsal, real-
time task-level control of robot missions, and replay of 
recorded results in support of autonomous unmanned 
underwater, surface and air vehicles.  Geographic 
information system (GIS) layers, a 2D geographic plot, 
X3D visualization and telemetry-plotting capabilities 
provide users with multiple in-depth mission portrayals. 
Extensible 3D (X3D) graphics and other open data 
standards are used throughout, implemented using open-
source software for maximum repeatability and usefulness. 
Four example missions are shown in Figure 14.  In the 
upper left is a strategic-level mission that performs a series 
of logical decisions based on goal success.  Across the 
bottom of the upper display are three UUV/USV missions.  
At bottom is a detailed view of the test mission. 
 
Figure 14. Multiple AVCL missions for UUVs and USVs displayed in the AUV Workbench.  
In upper left and at bottom, the canonical search/sample/search rendezvous mission is shown 
with annotations added at each major step [19]. 
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Adding Ethics Constraints to Autonomous Missions
Taking Inventory.  Examination of a wide variety of 
manned and unmanned vehicle missions has revealed that 
most ethical decisions are based on observing constraints on 
action.  Figure 15 lists numerous requirements that must be 
met for a manned or unmanned vehicle to perform maritime 
operations in concert with other manned vehicles at sea.  In 
some respects, military ethical constraints are a superset of 
civilian ethical constraints since safety of navigation and 
other requirements are common concerns.   In every case, 
proper operation by unmanned systems remains a 
prerequisite for operation in concert with manned systems. 
This effort led to a further key insight:  ethical behaviors 
don’t define a new class of missions or decision-making 
algorithm.  Rather, ethical constraints inform regular 
mission plans with boundaries on action.    Thus a practical 
new approach is feasible: integrating ethical constraints into 
mission definitions, rather than considering ethical 
operations as some new mode or paradigm of artificial 
intelligence.   Ethical robot operations are thus similar to 
ethical manned operations:  rules of conduct and rules of 
engagement must be observed throughout missions. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Common ethical constraints for civil and military operations, including AVCL definability and AUV Workbench support.
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Implementation of Ethical Constraints in RBM 
Prior work [15] described initial efforts to integrate ethical 
constraints within RBM missions.  Figure 16 shows how 
the addition of simple constraint checking can be added to 
the text-based Prolog robot mission simulator.  In this case, 
we took the combined controller/simulator examined in 
[15] and added a default ethical check (confirmed or denied 
by the human user) prior to performing each mission task. 
 
 
Figure 17 shows the canonical mission revisited, showing 
how ethical constraints are both prerequisites and ongoing 
performance criteria for any task.  The examination of 
multiple examples to date indicates that addition of 
constraints can superimpose ethical criteria on top of 
mission execution.  This can be accomplished by 
straightforward modification of original mission. Each 
ethical-constraint violation equals a mission-task failure, 
thereby preserving the existing RBM control architecture 
for Strategic Level decision making. 
 
Figure 17.  In-place addition of ethical constraints to the 
canonical search/sample mission already examined in 
Figures 2, 4, 11, 12 and 14.  Constraints are prerequisites 
and operating conditions for each mission task.  Here, each 
ethical-constraint violation equals a mission-task failure. 
Note that this approach now shows how ethical questions 
can be posed as an integral part of mission task 
declarations.  The answers to such constraint checks can be 
provided by (a) a supervising human critic, (b) a virtual 
environment conducting a simulation, or (c) on-board robot 
sensors.  Therefore, in order to be meaningful, each ethical-
constraint question must have a determinable answer.  
Responses to constraints (such as “Confirm outside of 
hazardous area”) are then expressed as a single boolean 
result.  Multiple constraints are possible for a single given 
task (e.g. adding “during the time window”) but the overall 
result must be measurable as a boolean Success/Failure. 
Figure 16.  Modified RBM Prolog test program, 
originally based on mission definitions shown in Figure 3, 
integrating ethical checks into an RBM MEA mission 
controller.  Task and ethics result responses (success or 
failure) are provided by a supervising human user.  This 
approach enables manual testing of mission logic as well 
as corresponding ethical checks.  Annotated, from [15]. 
• Constraint 1: If ethical search of Area A is 
not possible, go to Goal 4. 
• Constraint 2: If ethical execution of Goal 
3, 4, or 5 is not possible, abort the mission.  
________________________________________ 
CG-USER(1): (tm)  ; ethical test mission, run #1 
Search Area A! 
Ethical execution possible?  no 
Phase aborted. Unethical command. 
Search Area B! 
Ethical execution possible?  no 
Mission aborted. Unethical command. 
________________________________________ 
CG-USER(19): (tm)  ; ethical test mission, run #2 
Search Area A! 
Ethical execution possible?  yes 
Execute command! 
Successful-1?  yes 
Sample environment! 
Ethical execution possible?  yes 
Execute command! 
Successful-2? ?  yes 
Search Area B! 
Ethical execution possible?  yes 
Execute command! 
Rendezvous UUV2! 
Ethical execution possible?  yes 
Execute command! 
Return to base! 
Ethical execution possible?  yes 




Based on this progress, even further evolution is possible in 
balancing the generality and composability of the basic 
RBM architectural control model.  The current binary logic 
(Succeed or Fail) model might be compatibly extended, 
without loss of generality, to simplify these separate sets of 
recovery actions by calling out the decision logic for 
ethical-constraint failures as a first-class construct.  
Rephrased, MEAs might have 3 outputs (Succeed, optional 
Ethics Fail, Task Fail) that make it easier to distinguish 
between ethical-constraint failures (rather than task-
performance failures).  Figure 18 explores this possibility. 
 
Figure 18.  Potential modification to Figure 13, adding 
ethical constraint checking to internal logic and common 
input/output goal interfaces.  General task composability is 
maintained without loss of generality.  This modified task 
structure can directly expose and distinguish between 
operational-task failures and ethical-constraint failures. 
Further mission design with corresponding simulation 
testing is needed to explore the tradeoffs associated with 
this enhanced construct.  Conceivably this approach 
towards defining intertwined parallel paths for operational 
successes and ethical successes might even enable logical 
or legal after-action tracing of robot activities, thereby 
providing the potential to confirm compliance with legal, 
administrative and other ethical constraints.   
Allowing human operators to analyze whether “the means 
taken justify the ends achieved” can directly expose the 
ethical constraints that were exercised in a given mission.  
These are promising directions deserving further 
exploration.  Continued investigation is likely to close the 
gap between well-meant (but vaguely defined) 
philosophical concerns and implementable, strictly 
controlled, humanly accountable, legally justifiable 
deployment of autonomous systems. 
 
Conclusions 
Ethical control of maritime robot missions is feasible. 
• Human mission tasking can be performed ethically, 
serving as a baseline pattern for robot mission design. 
• Robot tasking must be consistent with human missions, 
both for compatible operations and also for human 
confidence that robot actions are permissible. 
• Ethical constraints must be determinable. 
• Common mission orders can be created that are 
parsable, executable and semantically consistent for 
any autonomous robot of interest. 
• Ethical constraints can be applied to existing mission 
tasking to ensure that only authorized operations occur. 
• No new reasoning paradigms or advance philosophical 
computational models need to be invented or 
embedded in existing robots.  Ethical decision making 
lies in the definition of mission tasks and constraints. 
Recommendations for Future Work 
Multiple areas of work deserve further development. 
• A library of missions and corresponding ethical 
constraints for unmanned systems needs elaboration 
and open publication for further testing by a variety of 
interested parties. 
• Current work to catalog relevant ethical constraints 
need to be fully elaborated, tuned and aligned with 
primary references for civil and military operations 
including “Rules of the Road,” safety guidelines, 
reporting criteria for situations requiring external 
human permissions, Rules of Engagement (ROE), etc. 
• High-fidelity physically based simulation needs to 
complement and (where possible) precede at-sea 
testing to ensure that operational safety requirements 
for unmanned vehicles are met when mission tasks are 
constrained by ethical criteria. 
• AVCL development needs to build and compare the 
effectiveness of mission task and source code exporters 
corresponding to a large variety of dissimilar robots. 
• Naval and civil program plans for future unmanned 
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